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ABSTRACT
This paper is aimed at providing a scrupulous conceptual and historical framework in which to 
contextualize further investigations concerning the imperial economic initiatives in the first two centu-
ries of the Roman Empire. I will focus mainly on the problem of food supply. Indeed, this theme was 
at the core of imperial economic concerns and had, to a certain extent, a role within the development 
of Roman economic channels themselves. I will argue that grain euergetism was able to represent an 
effective means of positively affecting provincial food supply, given the fact that central control was 
structurally limited in the territories of the Empire. For this same reason, I also believe that imperial 
grain beneficia in the provinces represented an actual attempt to increase central control over imperial 
grain management.
Keywords: Roman economy. Food supply. Annona. Frumentarian euergetism. Centre vs periphery. 
Market. Redistribution.
Estudiar la economía romana y la gestión imperial del  
abastecimiento de trigo. Marco conceptual y contexto 
histórico para el estudio de las iniciativas económicas  
imperiales durante los siglos I y II d.C.
RESUMEN
Este artículo tiene como objeto la delineación del marco conceptual y del contexto histórico para 
desarrollar nuevas investigaciones sobre las iniciativas imperiales en el ámbito económico durante los 
dos primeros siglos del Imperio romano. Me centraré, sobre todo, en el problema del abastecimiento 
de trigo a las ciudades del Imperio, porque el tema ocupaba un lugar central en las preocupaciones 
económicas imperiales y tuvo una cierta incidencia en la misma evolución de los canales económicos 
del Imperio. Sugeriré que el “evergetismo” frumentario fue una estrategia efectiva para contribuir al 
abastecimiento de trigo en las provincias, donde el control imperial era estructuralmente limitado. Por 
la misma razón, creo que los beneficia imperiales de trigo en las ciudades provinciales fueron un intento 
de fortalecer el control imperial sobre la gestión frumentaria.
Palabras clave: Economía romana. Abastecimiento de trigo. Annona. Evergetismo frumentario. Centro 
vs. periferia. Mercado. Redistribución.
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1. Introduction 1
While references to the Emperors are obviously to be found in almost every work 
concerning imperial Roman economy, monographies focused on the economic initia-
tives of individual Emperors are scarce. Indeed, analysing the government of an Em-
peror from an economic point of view is particularly tricky, since it implies combining 
both macroscale and microscale perspectives. Besides, the methodology and categories 
used by the historians of ancient economy –often borrowed from other fields of study– 2 
may sound somewhat unfamiliar to many biographers and scholars who are instead 
used to dealing with mainly literary and epigraphic sources with a prosopographical or 
événementiel approach. We also have to consider that the history of ancient economy it-
self offers the scholars increasing challenges. In fact, the diatribe between different and 
sometimes opposite interpretations and modelizations of Roman economy is far from 
being concluded. It is clear that a study focused on the economic policies of individual 
Emperors cannot avoid such questions. No doubt, a long-term diachronic perspective 
must be considered as well, in order to clarify whether each of these policies did indeed 
mark an evolution, and if so, to what degree? 
Last but not least, clarification is required as to whether the sources –literary, 
epigraphic, and archaeological– are in fact sufficient in order to chart a thorough 
history of the economic policies of the individual Emperors. Hence a further 
problem arises, which has been duly described by Panciera in the 90’s. 3 This scholar 
has observed that while on the one hand, more and more sophisticated local corpora, 
excavation reports and catalogues have been published, we are still without corpora 
“unitariamente concepiti e coordinati fra loro che siano veramente in grado di chi-
arire il quadro della produzione e distribuzione” and the imperial economy of the 1st 
and 2nd century in general. 4 The traditional absence of such corpora has undoubtedly 
contributed to the lack of studies which integrate into an economic scenario the “old” 
prosopographical and événementiel perspective focused on the individual Emperors. 
1  I would like to thank the Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst (DAAD) for having funded my 
research project “Wheat Management During the Hadrian Empire” between Autumn 2013 and Spring 2014 
and the University of Verona for having funded my research between 2015 and 2016. I would also like to 
express my gratitude to Prof. José Remesal Rodríguez of the University of Barcelona, Principal Investigator of 
the group CEIPAC: Production and Distribution of Food during the Roman Empire: Economic and Political 
Dynamics, for his support and suggestions. 
2  The title of a volume edited by Peter F. Bang, Mamoru Ikeguchi and Harmut G. Ziche (Bang et alii 
2006) sounds emblematic.
3  Panciera 1993, 31.
4  Regarding this obstacle see also Erdkamp 2005, 1-2: for the epigraphic and literary record, he warns us 
that we have to deal with possible distortions and representations of only ideal situations.
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Nevertheless, many progresses have been made in the last decade regarding our over-
all knowledge of Roman production and distribution. I recall for instance the achieve-
ments of the group “Production and Distribution of Food during the Roman Empire: 
Economic and Political Dynamics” led by Remesal Rodríguez, whose goal is pre-
cisely “to set up an innovative framework to investigate the political and economical 
mechanisms that characterized the dynamics of the commercial trade system during 
the Roman Empire”. 5 Therefore, the debate concerning these themes is at present 
particularly intense. New publications are expected and monographies on individual 
Emperors from an economic point of view will be most welcomed.
This paper is precisely aimed at providing a scrupulous conceptual and historical 
framework in which to contextualize further investigations concerning the economic 
initiatives of individual Emperors in the first two centuries of the Roman Empire. In 
particular, I will draw a synthetic and up-to-date status quaestionis of the academic 
debate on Roman economy and its dilemmas. On the other hand, I will outline an 
introductory diachronic panorama of the Roman economy of the 1st and 2nd centu-
ries. I will focus mostly on the problem of food supply. Indeed, as we will see, this 
theme was at the core of imperial economic concerns and had, to a certain extent, a 
role within the development of Roman economic channels themselves. Moreover, a 
few original considerations regarding the role of the Emperor within provincial food 
supply will be put forward in the last paragraph of this work.
2. Tendencies in Roman economy in the 1st and 2nd century in the light of different 
interpretative models
The overall interpretation of Roman economy is by no means an easy task. The old 
diatribe between a primitivistic versus modernistic interpretation of it is to some ex-
tent still open. 6 The position of Weber, 7 who interpreted Roman economy as a form of 
Raubkapitalismus heading for decline with the establishment of the Pax Augusta, has 
been somewhat radicalized in the 1970’s by Finley. 8 Finley, the promoter of the so-
called “new orthodoxy”, offers a “primitivistic” interpretation of Roman economy, 
denying its dynamism, its integration and the importance of the market. He compre-
hends the imperial economy as strongly centralized, a “commanded” economy. The 
primitivistic vision presumes that the economy of the Romans was constructed on 
power relations, centred on institutions such as labour, tribute and tenancy. This posi-
tion has been largely adopted by Garnsey and Saller 9 and by Jongman. 10 On the other 
hand, the negative interpretation of Weber has already been discussed by Rostovtzeff, 
who observed that objects produced in a corner of the Empire appear in very distant 
5  http://www.roman-ep.net/epnet/#.
6  It is very clearly summarized by Lo Cascio 1991; Witschel 2001 and Remesal Rodríguez 2008. See 
also the summary provided by Harris 1993. 
7  Weber 1909.
8  Finley 1973.
9  Garnsey – Saller 1987.
10  Jongman 1988.
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places from where they were produced, and gave the phenomenon a “modernistic” 
interpretation. Using modern parameters, he interpreted Roman imperial economy 
as a “capitalistic” system, based on the development of production and market. Such 
process was thus stimulated by the urban growth in the early Empire and the birth 
of an urban “bourgeoisie”, especially in the provinces, after the establishment of the 
Pax Augusta. 11
Nowadays Rostovtzeff’s position sounds somewhat outdated, since all agree that 
we cannot systematically apply our modern categories to the Roman world. 12 On the 
other hand, many contemporary scholars generally disagree with a pure primitivistic 
perspective, which does not seem to take into account the archaeological evidence 
that clearly demonstrates the existence of a wide net of exchanges within the Roman 
Empire. The extension of such a net presupposes a very complex and various sce-
nario. As Harris observes, the point is to describe a system which was certainly not 
modern, but not necessarily primitive, unsophisticated and small-scale. 13 Hence new 
theories have been developed which all claim the importance of market relations 
along with power relations.
Already in the 80’s Remesal Rodríguez underscored the coexistence within Ro-
man economy of centrifugal elements and centralism. In particular, from the study 
of production and commerce of Baetican oil, he demonstrates that an organized and 
centralized system actually existed at least for those products which could not be 
found in the majority of regions where the legions were settled. 14 According to this 
scholar this organized system was the annona. Harris, for his part, observes that an 
element of dynamism in Roman economy was represented by inter-local exchanges 
and provoked by the presence of “consuming” centres, namely the cities. 15 Pleket 
argues for a similarity between Roman economy and the economies of pre-industrial 
Europe, 16 whereas Carandini somewhat recognizes an “economic rationality” in the 
Roman world, especially in the villas of central Italy run by slave labor. 17 
An important and successful theory explaining the intrinsic dynamism of Roman 
economy had already been proposed by Hopkins. His “taxes and trade” model states 
that trade in the Roman Empire was stimulated by the Roman fiscal system: 18 the re-
gions subject to money taxes (“tax producing regions”) were compelled to sell their 
goods to the “tax consuming regions” in order to earn enough money to provide the 
same “tax consuming regions” with the required revenues. Such a process undoubt-
edly stimulated the dynamism of Roman economy.
11  Rostovtzeff 1926.
12  The economist Polanyi (1968) was one of the first researchers to deny the existence of the “market” 
in ancient societies: he believed that before the industrial era the economies were based upon mechanisms of 
reciprocity and redistribution: a critique of Polanyi’s notion of “redistribution” is proposed by Veyne 1976, 
67-74.
13  Harris 1993, 15.
14  Remesal Rodríguez 1986; Id. 1995. 
15  Harris 2000.
16  Pleket 1990.
17  Carandini 1988. More recently, the relative integration of trade in the Roman Empire has been 
reaffirmed by Witschel 2001.
18  Hopkins 1980; Id. 1983.
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Many recent theories agree that central control in Roman economy was enacted to 
a certain extent by market institutions and –as opposed to the old pessimistic position 
of Weber– that the Roman Empire saw a substantial growth of production between 
the 1st and 2nd century, as demonstrated by the amount of archeaological findings. Lo 
Cascio 19 believes that this phenomenon cannot be exclusively interpreted as a conse-
quence of demographic growth. Instead –he suggests– it seems to have been the re-
sult of the implemented primary sector. According to him this process was connected 
both to the expansion of fairly integrated market relations 20 and monetization, and to 
urbanization and imperial fiscal system. 21 He believes that within the Roman imperial 
world “primitivistic” mechanisms such as reciprocity and redistribution –based on 
power relations– seem to have played less important a role than the market. The ele-
ments outlined by Lo Cascio –integrated market relations, monetization, urbanization 
and imperial fiscal system– were undoubtedly interconnected. According to Kessler 
and Temin, for example, the integration of the market was precisely a consequence 
of the fact that in the first two centuries AD the Roman Empire was fully monetized 
(as they infer by studying the grain prices). 22 On the other hand, Katsari believes that 
the monetization of the Empire was a consequence of the attractive power of urban 
centres, which attracted peasants, merchants and, in the frontier zones, soldiers. 23
In 2005 Erdkamp challenges to some extent such an interpretation of Roman econ-
omy, by focusing, in particular, on the Roman grain market and food supply. 24 In 
fact, he states the very low level of integration of the Roman trade and is convinced 
that the weight of free market within long distances should not be overemphasized. 
Instead he believes that the food supply of towns was controlled by the élites, and 
that the peasants remained fundamentally excluded from the massive scale market. 25 
Nevertheless, the dynamism of Roman economy of the 1st and 2nd centuries and the 
importance of commerce have been recently reaffirmed by many experts in Roman 
economy on the basis of the material evidence. As such, from a theoretical perspec-
tive, Remesal Rodríguez strongly promotes the overcoming of a rigid dichotomy 
between primitivism and modernism. 26 Bang, 27 in his turn, presents the “industrial 
bazaar” model, typical of Eastern bazaars, as a sort of bridge between “primitive” 
19  Lo Cascio 1991, 324-330.
20  Concerning not only luxury products, but also staple foods.
21  Lo Cascio 1991, 351-358, underlining the existence of “tax consuming” and “tax producing” regions, 
adopts the model “taxes and trade” proposed by Hopkins: nevertheless he suggests certain adjustments.
22  Kessler – Temin 2008.
23  Katsari 2008.
24  Erdkamp 2005.
25  On this particular aspect see the different position of Lemak 2006, who recalls that in a number of 
circumstances peasants were able to create large-scale, inter-regional agricultural systems. He quotes in 
particular Brookfield 2001; Mayer 2002 and Scarborough 2003. 
26  Remesal Rodríguez 2008, 155: “Like the primitivists, I recognize that the means of production and of 
transportation were very limited in the ancient world. Nevertheless, this limitation cannot make us deny the 
existence of long-distance commerce in the Roman Empire. The archaeological evidence demonstrates that 
such commerce existed, so the question here is to explain how and why, despite all the limitations highlighted 
by the primitivists, such traffic of goods ever existed. The point is to explain why this commerce existed and 
not to deny it, as the primitivists do”. Already Remesal Rodríguez 2002.
27  Bang 2006.
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interchange and modern market, and believes that this system is closer to the mecha-
nisms of Roman economy.
In the Cambridge Economic History of the Graeco-Roman world these very 
problems are dealt from alternative viewpoints. 28 Morley, 29 in particular, is convinced 
that the political and cultural integration of the Empire went hand in hand with its 
economic integration that connected widely separated regions through the movement 
of goods. He states that distribution –as means of managing risk of glut and dearth– 
was organized through both networks of kinship, friendship or patronage, and market. 
Following Remesal Rodríguez’s considerations concerning the annona militaris and 
the supply of Rome, he recalls that the archaeological findings have confirmed the wide 
range of distribution and connects the phenomenon to the development of centres of de-
mand for foodstuffs and other basic materials –the legions, Rome and other big cities– 
which could never be fully supplied locally and necessitated the development of more 
elaborate systems of distribution. 30 Also the fiscal system –Morely believes echoing 
Hopkins– stimulated the movement of goods and the production of coinage oiled the 
wheels of distribution. In any case –Morely concludes echoing Remesal Rodríguez– 
the patterns of distribution and the structures of inter-regional exchange in the Roman 
Empire were not autonomous, since they always reflected the needs of the state and the 
élite. Alcock, 31 in her turn, focusing on the Eastern Mediterranean, reaffirms the impor-
tance of trade in the Roman Empire and the role of Romanization in this phenomenon. 32 
Lo Cascio has contributed, too, to the Cambridge Economic History 33 and suggests that 
the Emperor “set the rules” of the economic game, influencing both the central and 
provincial administration and the single urban communities. 34 
More recently, Adams, in the Cambridge Companion to Roman Economy edited by 
Scheidel, 35 reaffirms the integration of the market in the Roman Empire. The scholar 
claims that the regional diversity in the Mediterranean sea 36 naturally undermines one 
of the two key limitations placed on ancient economy by primitivist approaches, “that 
due to the similarities of climate and topography, areas adjoining the Mediterranean 
had the same needs and surpluses, thus there was little stimulus to trade. This notion 
depends us imagining, as Harris as pointed out, widespread autarky, but would specifically 
rule out a regional nature to the Mediterranean. The reality was quite different, there 
was short and long trade, cabotage, ferrying, and long voyages, both by land and sea”. 37 
28  Scheidel et alii 2007.  
29  Morley 2007.
30  As seen, Remesal Rodríguez believes that, in the case of the legions and Rome, this system was the 
annona.
31  Alcock 2007.
32  “Entry into an imperial system, it is clear, led to substantial change in all important aspects of eastern 
economic behavior –in external demands and expectations, in productive goals and capacities, in modes and 
distances of distribution, in civic and individual habits of consumption” (Alcock 2007, 696).
33  Lo Cascio 2007.
34  Ferrer Maestro 2012, 248, in his turn, will speak of  “procedimiento estatal forzado por las necesidades 
de gestión pública. Un comercio por orden del emperador y ejercitado bajo su control”.
35  Adams 2012.
36  Quite recently underlined by Horden – Purcell 2000.
37  Horden – Purcell 2000, 219.
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In 2013 a book by Temin significantly entitled The Roman Market Economy was 
published. This scholar strongly disagrees with the primitivisitic point of view and ar-
gues that Roman society was wholly determined by commercial links and that ancient 
landowners and workers acted as modern capitalists and wage-earners. 38 Undoubted-
ly, we find here an echo of the old diatribe between primitivists and modernists.
On the other hand, in 2009 Chic García has rightly reaffirmed the importance of 
overcoming such opposition. He has put forward a new interpretative model of an-
cient economy, by identifying two fundamental and complementary economic as-
pects: market and prestige. 39 In particular, on the basis that every historical period 
saw a combination of prestige economy and impersonal market, he has observed how 
in Rome at the beginning the State was weak and left free initiative to particulars. In 
such a scenario private initiative filled up the spaces left by the state control. When 
the Roman Empire started developing an economy comparable with the ancient Mid-
dle-East palatial economies, it relied on private initiative (mostly of the liberti). The 
State put in motion the great part of the markets but most merchants were particular: 
there was a sort of commercial individualism which was bound to be a very dynamic 
element in the development of the organizing rationality of the human communi-
ty. As centralism got stronger, the private merchants went on doing their business, 
but the State tended to convert them into commercial agents, and their relationship 
was mediated by professional guilds. Roman economy implied further phenomenon 
which hampered a full development of market economy. First of all Roman Economy 
always had a strong military orientation. The second aspect was the clientelism at the 
basis of Roman society: this always affects market relations.
Ferrer Maestro 40 has also underlined the complexity of Roman Imperial economy. 
The so-called “rural” and “domestic” economy, implying barter exchange and au-
to-consumption, always coexisted with the attested large scale market: 41 the respec-
tive predominance depended on the geographical environment –territories more or 
less marginal and urbanized– and historical context –periods of crisis or stability. By 
taking into account the data he presents, and the modern definition of “market” he 
recalls, 42 we realize once more how we can hardly speak of “free market” regarding a 
society of administered prices, at least as far as grain was concerned.
38  Temin 2013. In his opinion the state intervention implied by the mechanisms of the annona is also 
to contextualize in a predominantly free market scenario and in a single, large, integrated grain market. His 
hypotheses were discussed by Erkamp 2014. Temin had already expressed a few of his hypotheses in a book 
published in 2008 with Kessler: Kessler – Temin 2008. By studying the grain prices they argue that in the first 
two centuries AD the Roman Empire was fully monetized: they believe that the result was a fully integrated 
market. 
39  Chic García 2009.
40  Ferrer Maestro 2012.
41  Lo Cascio 1991, 324-330, also warned us not to forget the residual importance of auto-consumption 
based on what he calls “peasant economy”.
42  Fraser 1937, 131-132.
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3. Roman 1st and 2nd century economy: a complex and dynamic model
On the basis of all these considerations we can conclude that the Roman economy 
during the Empire was a system particularly complex and characterized by a strong 
dynamism, both in space and in time. The first aspect, recognized by most of contem-
porary scholars, is the high vitality in Roman economy during the first two centuries 
of the Empire, a vitality which is expressed by a significant increase in production 
–and therefore in the overall “wealth”. Many scholars, as we have seen, connected 
such a phenomenon with a relative integration of the market and a certain degree of 
free market within the Empire. The second aspect is the presence in such a scenario of 
fundamental sectors organized according to a centralistic logic, such as the food sup-
ply of the army and Rome. In this case the patterns of distribution and the structures 
of inter-regional exchange in the Roman Empire cannot be considered autonomous, 
since they clearly reflected the needs of the state.
There is a third, important, aspect of the Roman economy during this given period: 
the progressive concentration of wealth in the hands of the provincial élites, often at 
the expense of the middle classes and the weaker social groups. Such a phenomenon 
is most likely related to the growth of production itself, which, as we have seen, 
characterized the first two centuries of the Empire. 43 On the other hand, as Zuider-
hoek explained, the growth of population 44 must also have had a crucial role, at least 
as far as the progressive “oligarchization of wealth” is concerned. In fact, if popu-
lation grows, land becomes more and more scarce in relation to labour, so it means 
there is more demand than supply. This means that rents start to rise, advantaging 
the land-owners and affecting small peasants, farmers and wage labourers. 45 More-
over, as underlined by Chic García, 46 the urban development did not see a parallel 
development of land production aimed at feeding the increasingly consuming population. 
Landowners were not interested in increasing the productivity of their enterprises 47 and 
looked rather at performing activities (such as naval investments addressed to state 
food supply) which would exempt them from fiscal duties. As a consequence, the 
fiscal pressure on the middle classes grew harder: this undoubtedly contributed to the 
43  Zuiderhoek 2009, 59, has precisely connected the dramatic increase in euergetism and in the number 
of eastern homines novi in the Senate in the 2nd century to a significant rise in prosperity among Eastern urban 
élites in that period.
44  Undoubtedly connected to the growth of production.
45  Zuiderhoek 2009, 53-70. See also Jongman 2006, 247-250 and, as far as grain is concerned, Erdkamp 
2007, especially 258-259: “Wealthy landowners had much better access to the grain market than their poorer 
neighbors, hampering the latter’s ability to sell their occasional surpluses”. Moreover, Erdkamp observes 
that the rents were generally paid in kind: therefore, the landowners end up controlling a large part of the 
marketable surplus. See also Alcock, 2007, 678, who focuses mainly on the Eastern provinces, observing 
that here but also elsewhere in the Empire the trend was towards an increasing stratification in the control of 
agricultural wealth. Regarding the growth of the wealth of the provincial élites it may be worth recalling also 
a study where Pleket 1983, suggests the Eastern élites involvement in business affairs.
46  Chic García 2014, 586 and passim.
47  We may well label this lack of entrepreneurial spirit of the élite as a “primitivistic”, pre-industrial trait 
of the Roman economy: see also Ferrer Maestro 2012, 249.
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oligarchization of wealth. Elsewhere 48 Chic García connects this phenomenon to the 
crisis occurred during the reign of Marcus Aurelius. The military campaigns against 
the Partians and Germanic and Sarmatic tribes emptied the state coffers and, along 
with a plague, provoked a collapse of manpower and production. Money inflation and 
the increasing of fiscal pressure were further consequences. No doubt all these events 
exasperated the intrinsic economic limits of the State, which tended to consume more 
than it produced. As a result, the State properties were enlarged and the great entre-
preneurs were the only capable of overcoming the crisis, at the expenses of smaller 
competitors. 49 
No doubt, the progressive oligarchization of society implied by the concentra-
tion of wealth can be interpreted as an element of “regression” and primitivism of 
Roman economy, in contrast with its intrinsic vitality. In such a scenario, like in the 
military supply, the patterns of distribution cannot be considered autonomous: they 
were linked to the needs of the power, in this case the élites. As we will see below, 
this oligarchization went abreast with the increasing euergetism among the cities of 
the Roman Empire. 
4. Food Supply of Rome and the provinces: an emblematic problem of Roman 
economy
At this point, I would like to focus primarily on the specific theme of food supply. 
In fact, it is somewhat emblematic since it encompasses almost all the questions just 
singled out, such as production, surplus, distribution and consumption. Moreover, 
food supply is particularly interesting within eventual studies of Roman economy 
focused on the role of individual Emperors, since the rulers were directly involved in 
the process, as we shall shortly see.
Several works have been devoted to Roman food supply, from various viewpoints 
and based on different typologies of sources. 50 The quite recent book edited by Marin 
and Virlouvet, Nourrir les cités de la Méditerranée, definitely stands out as a proof 
of interest with this theme. 51 As we shall see, the diatribe between more or less dy-
48  Chic García 1988 (updated version), especially 155-161.
49  As the scholar points out, such a phenomenon is suggested by the amphoric epigraphy of Baetica: in 
this period there is a particular diffusion of seals in the tria nomina form, which are to be interpreted as a sign 
of the high social status of the producer. In the second half of the 2nd century the seals of the Guadalquivir area 
also suggest a concentration in production.
50  To date we do not have many studies which compare the Roman system in this field and the food supply 
mechanisms of previous imperial systems such as the Babylonian and Assyrian Empires and Pharaonic Egypt: 
they would be of utmost interest indeed. In Eastern palatial societies, strongly hierarchized, production and 
food supply were strictly controlled by the central power and followed a redistributive, a “common good” 
logic. An analysis of the peculiarities of ancient Eastern societies in this field is provided by Chic García 
2009, 231-270. As this scholar observes (Ibid., 165), however, the “collective perspective” of these societies 
did not rule out individual initiative. No doubt, interesting point of contacts with the Roman system may be 
recognized here.
51  Marin – Virlouvet 2004. Ten years before the proceedings of a conference on this topic were also 
published: see Centre Jean Bérard (ed.) 1994. 
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namic interpretations of Roman economy involves this topic as well. The control of 
annona, the system which regulated the Roman grain supply, along with the supply 
of the army, 52 was crucial for imperial power and consensus. 53 Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the annona system was officially run by the Emperor himself (along 
with his praefectus annonae), who supervised the whole system, grounded on a wide 
range of movements both of men and products within the large boundaries of the 
Empire, across countless trade routes. The imperial annona manoeuvred the whole 
mechanism of the inter-provincial trade by purchasing and transporting an enormous 
amount of wheat and other essential goods. The largest amount of grain arrived in 
Rome from Africa (mainly from the hinterlands of Cyrene and Carthage) and Egypt. 
Nevertheless, also Sicily –which had been the most important source of grain during 
the Republic– continued to play a very important role. 54 
Along with a monography of Pavis d’Escourac, which explores the administrative 
aspects of the imperial annona, 55 the starting point of the examination of Roman 
grain supply is the study of Rickman published in 1980. 56 He focuses mainly on the 
imperial age, dealing with transport, storage, prices and frumentationes. 57
We know that the annona system was based upon provincial taxes, products from 
imperial estates and to some extent upon private purchase by either the state or by in-
dividuals. 58 Nevertheless, which were the precise mechanisms of distribution? Rick-
man believes that during the early Empire fixed taxes in cash had taken the place of 
tithes, except in Egypt. 59 Therefore –he concludes– if there were fewer taxes in kind 
than previously, and yet the need in Rome for grain to eat was certainly no less than 
before, the important role that private grain merchants played is clearly evident. More 
precisely, as far as transport and distribution are concerned, Rickman believes that 
the imperial control over grain supply relied upon private traders and private ships. 
According to the scholar, in fact, the state lacked an adequate distribution structure. 60 
52  As we have seen this is the idea of Remesal Rodríguez (1986 and 1999) and of other scholars 
which followed this interpretation vs Pavis d’Escurac’s reductive description of the annona as an institution 
only addressed to Rome (Pavis d’Escurac 1976). A bibliography on these themes is provided by Remesal 
Rodríguez 2002a, 121, footnote 17.
53  Remesal Rodríguez 1999, 248-249, Id. 2002a; also Id. 2008, 155-156. The scholar underlines how the 
state understood the importance of facilitating the acquisition by citizens living in Rome of a certain amount 
of grain at a reduced price. The scholar reaffirms this concept in Remesal Rodríguez 2012, 220 in particular. 
Regarding this theme I recall, for instance, the emblematic case of Vespasianus: as Tacitus explained (Hist. 
2.82; 3.8), the general seized the power in Rome once he got the control of Egypt, “claustra annonae”, that is 
the “key” of annona. See already Gray 1923, 26. 
54  Sardinia, Gaul and Hispania also provided subsidiary supplies of potential significance.
55  Pavis d’Escurac 1976.
56  Rickman 1980. 
57  For a general history of Roman frumentationes see in particular 156-197 and 213-217. Rickman believes 
that the frumentationes were the core of the annona system. This interpretation, however, has been opposed by 
Remesal Rodríguez. The scholar defends the idea that the distributions were a privilege for a reduced group of 
Roman citizens, whereas the action of the praefectura annonae was addressed to all, and should keep social 
peace in Rome by keeping everyone’s belly full: Remesal Rodríguez 1986. On the grain distributions in 
Rome see also Virlouvet 1995 and 2009 where she analyses the “plebs frumentaria”.
58  Rickman 1980, 72-74.
59  It is the idea of Alcock 2007, especially 676, as well.
60  Rickman has developed this theme in a further study: Rickman 1980a.
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This presumed lack of systematic organization of imperial food supply is to some 
extent claimed by Garnsey as well. By focusing, in particular, on food supply emer-
gencies –that is dearth and famine– this scholar observes that from August onwards 
a standard imperial response to crisis was “largesse”: Emperors generally rejected 
price-fixing in favour of the grand gesture, the furnishing of grain or cash by special 
distribution. 61 
Nevertheless, Rickman’s explanation of the role of free merchants on the basis 
of the prevalence of taxes in cash during the first Empire appears to be arguable. In-
deed, as Remesal Rodríguez has outlined, the amount of products that came from the 
imperial properties –and he demonstrates, through the archaeological evidence, that 
grain was not the only annonarius product– fulfilled a large percentage of the basic 
needs of the Roman plebs, army and servants to the administration, without the use of 
money. 62 Indeed, between the 1st and the 2nd century, the Emperors increased the 
amount of grain available: large private granaries fell increasingly into imperial own-
ership through confiscation, legacy and inheritance. 63 On the basis of this considera-
tion, Remesal Rodríguez interprets the economy of the Roman Empire as an adminis-
trative compensation system among the provinces and between them and Rome. The 
functions of the praefectura annonae were thus to control all these resources and be 
responsible of their redistribution. 
Moreover, regarding the presumed lack of systematic organization of imperial 
food supply it must be observed that between the 1st and the 2nd century the more 
responsible Emperors 64 made structural improvements within the system of supply 
and distribution, a fact that Rickman himself admits, recognizing a progressive cen-
tralization of the annona system. 65 In particular, the Emperors introduced changes in 
the administration of the annona, sought to attract additional traders into the service 
of food supply, and improved the port facilities of Rome, first at Puteoli and later at 
Ostia. 66 Augustus himself was particularly interested in the annona and added Egypt 
as a major supplier of the capital. In 22 BC he accepted the cura annonaria and this 
event is the first political fact mentioned in the Res Gestae after the list of the imperial 
deeds. 67 The first Emperor also claims to have distributed grain from his own grana-
61  Garnsey 1988. On famine in the Roman world see already Virlouvet 1985.
62  Remesal Rodríguez 1986 (see also Id. 1999; Id. 2002).
63  Garnsey 1988, 239 and 250. See also Rickman 1980, 139. Regarding the phenomenon of confiscation 
of lands and goods by the Emperor see Remesal Rodríguez 2012: at 221-222 he focuses especially on 
Tiberius: “El emperador necesitaba de recursos ‘propios’ para poder justificar su preeminencia, era él, como 
Augusto, quien, con sus ‘propios’ recursos, mantenía el imperio”; at 226 he focuses on Neron, the depredator 
par excellence.
64  See Remesal Rodríguez 2002a, regarding the providentia of the Emperors.
65  “The Emperor’s finance clerks availing themselves of the ubiquitous procuratores of the Emperor, 
who were in every province of the Empire, either looking after the Emperor’s private property, or his public 
revenues, came to have the best overall grasp of the total financial picture of the Empire” (Rickman 1980, 
77-78).
66  Garnsey 1988, 231. A thorough analysis of the evolution of the annona system, its progressive 
centralization and the role of the Emperors is also provided by Chic García 1988 (updated version).
67  Remesal Rodríguez 2008, 156.
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ries. 68 At the end of his reign, when he was certain he had control over the whole sup-
ply system, Augustus left the direct control of the praefectura annonae in the hands of 
two former praetors who should be appointed every year to carry out these function. 69 
As regards Claudius, he promoted the winter navigation of merchants and tried to 
attract them into the service of annona by means of offering privileges to shipbuilders 
and ship-owners. 70 According to Garnsey, after Claudius, the next Emperor known 
to have dealt with these issues is Hadrian. 71 He ruled that only those who invested 
the major part of their resources into the service of the annona could enjoy immunity 
from public liturgies. 72 As a passage by Seneca the Younger suggests, under Nero, or 
shortly before, an “Alexandrian fleet” was created, bringing all or most of the grain 
from Egypt to Rome. 73 Trajan, in his turn, promoted state purchases which eased the 
annona, as we learn from the Plinian Panegyric. 74 Thanks to this Emperor the larger 
ships were able to sail direct to Ostia to unload their grain in relative safety. The pro-
motion of public works also attests the imperial concern with Rome’s supply, since it 
provided people with job and thus with money for food, as we learn from the famous 
anecdote involving Vespasian recalled by Svetonius. 75 
On the basis of all these considerations, we are allowed to conclude that, between 
the 1st and the 2nd century, the Emperors were strongly concerned with the food sup-
ply of Rome. Private traders might have played a certain role, since bringing in the 
grain was a profit-making enterprise, which became more attractive thanks to the fa-
vourable terms provided by the state. 76 Under this point of view, we cannot totally ex-
68  Res Gestae 18: Inde ab eo anno, quo Cn. et P. Lentuli consules fuerunt, cum deficerent vectigalia, tum 
centum millibus hominum tum pluribus multo frumentarias et nummariás tesseras ex aere et patrimonio meo 
dedi.
69  Remesal Rodríguez 1986; Id. 1995; Id. 2008.
70  Suet. Claud. 18.2: Vrbis annonaeque curam sollicitissime semper egit. Cum Aemiliana pertinacius 
arderent, in diribitorio duabus noctibus mansit ac deficiente militum ac familiarum turba auxilio plebem per 
magistratus ex omnibus uicis conuocauit ac positis ante se cum pecunia fiscis ad subueniendum hortatus est, 
repraesentans pro opera dignam cuique mercedem. Artiore autem annona ob assiduas sterilitates detentus 
quondam medio foro a turba conuiciisque et simul fragminibus panis ita infestatus, ut aegre nec nisi postico 
euadere in Palatium ualuerit, nihil non ex[eo]cogitauit ad inuehendos etiam tempore hiberno commeatus. 
Nam et negotiatoribus certa lucra proposuit suscepto in se damno, si cui quid per tempestates accidisset, et 
naues mercaturae causa fabricantibus magna commoda constituit pro condicione cuiusque. See also Tac. Ann. 
12.43 and Orosius 7.6.17.
71  We should however recall a measure of Neron who established that the ship of a negotiator serving 
Rome should not be rated with the rest of his taxable property but be exempt from tributum (Tac. Ann. 13.51): 
see Rickman 1980, 76. Regarding the privileges granted by Claudius, Hadrian and following Emperors to the 
navicularii see also Pavis d’Escurac 1976, 215-220.
72  Garnsey 1988, 223 and 233-235.
73  Epistula 77.1: Subito nobis hodie Alexandrinae naves apparuerunt, quae praemitti solent et nuntiare 
secuturae classis adventum: tabellarias vocant. Gratus illarum Campaniae aspectus est: omnis in pilis 
Puteolorum turba consistit et ex ipso genere velorum Alexandrinas quamvis in magna turba navium intellegit, 
etc.: he recalls the arrival of the Alexandrine fleet in Puteoli, welcomed by many people who were standing 
on the docks.
74  29.4-5. See also Rickman 1980, 85-86.
75  Vesp. 18: Mechanico quoque grandis columnas exigua impensa perducturum in Capitolium pollicenti 
praemium pro commento non mediocre optulit, operam remisit praefatus sineret se plebiculam pascere: see 
Remesal Rodríguez 1986, 123.
76  Garnsey 1988, 74.
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clude a certain role of free market in the annona system, as suggested for example by 
Sirks, 77 Hoebenreich, 78 Harris, 79 Lo Cascio 80 and Witschel. 81 Nevertheless, the role 
of the central government within the Roman food supply and its interventism –clear 
in the measures taken by Claudius– cannot be denied. 82 Regarding the “commercial 
activities” which materially provided Rome with food, they were merely an aspect of 
a system of food supply fundamentally redistributive. 83 
It must also be recalled that the crisis of Marcus Aurelius’s reign mentioned above 
had a strong impact on the annona system. Money inflation and lack of liquidity had 
the following result: the State could not compensate producers and merchants for ba-
sic staples (grain but also oil) and transport, and these products and services became 
taxes in kind. Therefore dealing with grain and oil production and transport was not 
as convenient as before and just the richest entrepreneurs could actually survive, at 
the expenses of the smaller producers. 84
77  Sirks 1991, 13.
78  Hoebenreich 1997. She thinks that the governmental organization of the supply sector even during the 
Principate was limited to intervention at times of crises, and that the market, which was dominated by private 
trade, was in large part left without public protection against its structural fluctuations.
79  Harris 2000, 717: he thinks that most of the grain which was imported in Rome was not the government’s 
at all but rather the object of private commerce.
80  Lo Cascio 2000: he is convinced that the provisioning of Rome or the armies did not by-pass the 
market. Contra Erdkamp 2005, who goes back to a rather centralized interpretation of Roman annona. He 
thinks that the sustenance of the capital city of Rome and the Roman armies required the intervention of 
the state on the basis of coercive, non-market channels. He admits that the state relied on private shippers 
and traders for transportation and distribution, but claims that the grain market in Rome functioned in a 
strictly regulated environment. In such a scenario two main kinds of intervention could be distinguished: the 
corn dole, and the transportation and storage of public grain. The answer of Lo Cascio (2007, 641) is worth 
quoting: “The range and nature of the state intervention might be taken to suggest the food supply of the capital 
did not rely on market mechanisms and that we are dealing with an example of “administrated trade”. It is 
certainly true that tax and rent grain accounted for a substantial and growing share of the grain that arrived at 
Rome. However, private merchants and shippers were involved in this operation, and their status as private 
entrepreneurs remained unaffected”. 
81  Witschel 2001, 122: concerning the annona system, he observes that although the central government 
strengthened its control over the navicularii, who transported the grain, private initiative enjoyed large 
freedom of action in the 1st and the 2nd century.
82  Remesal Rodríguez 2012, 225.
83  See Remesal Rodríguez 2008, 158: “This redistributive function cannot be understood as true 
commerce, even though it generated an economic activity, because those in charge of transportation received 
a payment, the vecturae, from the state and because under the shadow of this redistribution free commercial 
activities could be accomplished. Those activities, since Claudio’s time, were encouraged by the concession of 
social privileges to those who dedicated themselves to satisfying the needs of the Roman market”. Erdkamp 
2002a, 65-68, proposes analogous considerations regarding the military supply, saying that the frumentum 
emptum should not be confused with trade.
84  This phenomenon is attested, e. g., by the prevalence of names of rich families in the seals on the 
Baetican oil amphorae of this period: Chic García 1988, 155-162 (updated version) and 2014, 592-594.
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5. The coins: a special documentary source regarding the grain supply of Rome
As we have seen, the intrinsic coin value and its fluctuations had a strong impact 
on the Roman economy and, more particularly, on the annona system. Neverthe-
less, coins had a further, fundamental role as means of propaganda. Focusing on the 
imperial role, Rickman interprets the coins which bear symbols of the annona as 
a reference to an increasing intention of the Emperors to advertise their role in the 
Roman grain supply. 85 Regarding the republican emissions, there is apparently no 
consistent attempt by the Senate to express a state concern for corn supply. The same 
can be said of Augustus and Tiberius. 86 With Claudius and Nero things changed, and 
references to annona on the coins became explicit. 87 After Nero, there was a new im-
petus in the use of coinage propaganda and reassurance about the corn supply of the 
capital: both Galba and Otho celebrated Ceres in their coins. Vitellius faced Vespa-
sian, who was in control of Egypt, and therefore of Egyptian grain. It was important 
to reassure the population of Rome that all was well with corn supply: this fact may 
explain the occurrence of references to annona in his coins. 88 According to Rickman, 
Vespasian, as the real controller of Rome’s annona, was less in need of advertising 
the safeguarding of sea-borne supply. This may explain why we find a series with 
Annona, Ceres and modii only towards the end of his reign. These types may refer in 
particular to an improvement of Italian agriculture in that precise period. 89 Annona 
types also appear under Titus 90 and Domitian, when the legend ANNONA AUG S. C. 
appears associated with a ship prow, 91 a type which would come again under Hadrian 
and Septimius Severus. With Trajan, instead, no coin bears a legend referring to corn 
supply, and neither ANNONA nor CERES find mention on coins. However, we do 
have two coin issues showing a woman which may be interpreted as the personifica-
tion of annona. 92 Rickman mentions briefly the Ceres and Annona types issued under 
Hadrian and claims that such themes enjoyed great fortune under Antoninus Pius. He 
underlines in particular a new type dated between AD 145 and 161, never repeated by 
later Emperors. 93 Parts of two ships appear with the personification of Annona, one 
85  Remesal Rodríguez 2002a, 125, also claims the importance of coins in this field, underlining how 
these were used by the Emperors to claim their providentia regarding food supply.
86  The only development is the identification between Ceres and the Empress –in this case Livia– which 
starts under Augustus and by the end of the 1st century AD had become common place: Rickman 1980, 259-
260.
87  Rickman recalls in particular the Claudian issue of CERES AUGUSTA SC and a further type showing 
a modius surrounded by the Emperor’s names: Rickman 1980, 74-75 (see RIC, I, Claudius, n° 94 and the 
modius types listed in RIC, I, p. 126). Nero, in his turn, in 64 issued the great bronze sestertii with the legend 
ANNONA AUGUSTI CERES SC associated with a ship prow (RIC, I, Nero, types listed at 159, 161, 173-4, 
177, 180, 183).
88  RIC I, 275-277.
89  Rickman 1980, 262.
90  RIC II, Titus, nn. 86 and 87.
91  RIC II, Domitianus, nº 262.
92  In the first type the alleged Annona (interpreted by Mattingly as Abundantia) faces a child, and the 
legend is SPQR OPTIMO PRINCIPUI ALIM ITAL (RIC II, Trajan, nº 243). The second type shows Annona 
(also interpreted by Mattingly as Abundantia) associated with a prow (RIC II, Trajan, n° 165 and 166).
93  RIC, III, Antoninus Pius, nº 757.
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carrying a modius with corn ears and poppy, and a lighthouse. This emission may be 
an allusion to the improvement in the situation concerning corn supply and the role 
played by a lighthouse. Rickman recalls in particular a passage from the Historia Au-
gusta, 94 stating that, among the building works promoted by Antoninus, a restoration 
of a lighthouse (probably that of Alexandria) took place. 95 Coins referring to annona 
also appeared with Marcus Aurelius, 96 Commodus and Septimius Severus. From this 
analysis, we can presume that, from Claudius onwards, all Emperors of the first two 
centuries AD were interested in advertising their grain policy. 
6. The impact of Roman Empire on the local food supply in the provinces
As regards the supply of the other parts of the Empire, we must take a step back 
and consider the situation before the birth of the Principate, in order to appreciate 
the elements of continuity and discontinuity in the passage within the channels of 
Roman administration. Apart from the exceptional case of big metropolis such as 
Alexandria and Antioch, the Mediterranean cities attempted to live on their own 
products as far as was possible, and above all on the grain which they themselves 
were able to grow. 97 Wealth was essentially in the hands of an élite. The city authori-
ties, who belonged to the same élite, assumed offices or undertook public services for 
the community, and showed generosity to the citizens in times of crisis. In particular, 
the city grain commissioners worked with benefactors who put up the money for 
grain purchase from abroad or provided grain for sale below market prices. The city 
authorities were therefore dependent upon the benefactions of private individuals: 
euergetism was thus the basis of food supply. 98 In any case, as Garnsey has suggested, 
it seems that euergetism was essentially an ad hoc response, not a lasting solution. 
He concludes that on the whole the ancient urban administrations did not develop an 
extensive framework of institutions capable of protecting citizens from starvation, a 
risk always present in the Mediterranean context, subject as it was to periodical pro-
ductive crises. 99 A question thus arises: what was the impact of the Roman Empire on 
provincial food supply? 
94  Antoninus 8.2.
95  Rickman 1980, 265.
96  According to Rickman certain annona coins of Marcus Aurelius –dated between 174-175– were aimed 
at reassuring the population of Rome regarding wheat supply: the years are those of the revolt of Avidius 
Cassius in the East: Rickman 1980, 265.
97  Erdkamp 2005, 260, and already Mitchell 1993, 244. Recently, see Harris 2000, 716, who focuses 
on Mediterranean under the Romans.
98  Garnsey 1988, 82. For this interpretation see also Kloft 1988; Quass 1993, 247; Garnsey – Morris 
1989. Also Strubbe 1989, and in particular 116-117, who claims that the urban funds apparently consisted 
mainly of contributions from private benefactors. As a proof of this phenomenon, the scholars have commented 
on a large number of inscriptions celebrating the generosity of local benefactors who gave grain, oil and wine 
or sold it cheap, contributed to funds for the food purchase, and served as grain commissioners. 
99  Garnsey 1988.
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As a matter of fact, the mechanisms of Hellenistic food supply did survive during 
the Roman period: 100 as the tituli reported in certain inscriptions demonstrate, the 
civic magistrates who, thanks to the euergesia of local notables, dealt with food sup-
ply –with eventual grain purchases from abroad– did not change their name in the 
new imperial regime. 101 Nevertheless, we have numerous documents proving that in 
particular circumstances of emergency the Roman authorities –and sometimes the 
Emperor himself– intervened in provincial food supply. As such, in dealing with this 
issue, the dialectic between central government and local institutions cannot be over-
looked. Furthermore, we could ask whether these government actions are interpretable 
as occasional initiatives modeled upon those provided by the local benefactors, or 
rather attempts at regulating the market, with a somewhat centralizing effort. What 
then was the role of the Roman central government?
The first quite evident aspect is strictly geopolitical and concerns the new cen-
trality of Rome in the Mediterranean world: an event that significantly altered the 
Mediterranean equilibrium and the channels of trade and food supply. The Romans 
became, more or less abruptly, the custodians of other people’s grain. 102 During oc-
casional supply crises, Egypt, Sicily, the Black Sea, Cyrene and Cyprus had exported 
grain to various city-states for centuries, especially since the Ptolemaic period, often 
with the intermediation of Rhodes. But now these all came under the control of Rome 
and this old equilibrium was broken. 103 Egypt, in particular, became a private proper-
ty of the Emperor. Although it is possible that this region was not the main contributor 
of grain to Rome, 104 there is little doubt that this event had strong consequences in the 
Mediterranean context. A city could now import Egyptian grain only with the permis-
sion of the Emperor. This phenomenon is attested by a handful of inscriptions, such 
as two famous epigraphs found respectively in Tralleis 105 and in Ephesus, 106 claiming 
100  In the Western provinces, instead, where there was no Hellenistic substratus, the mechanisms of food 
supply under the Roman rule were different: Dardaine – Pavis d’Escurac 1986 have focused on this theme, 
suggesting that in the West the distributions by local notables were occasional, and the alimentary crises, too. 
101  Regarding food supply magistrates between Hellenism and Roman time see already Rostovtzeff 
1926, 145-146; Balland 1981, who –as Pleket – Stroud 1981 point out– analyses the traditional σιτομέτρια 
in Greek cities, destined for all citizens and financed either from regular municipal funds or from more or less 
occasional gifts of magistrates and benefactors. Balland focuses on the privileged group of σιτομετρουμένοι 
ἄνδρες (...), who were citizens and (freedmen)-metics. See also Fantasia 1989; Frézouls 1991, 6-7; Pavis 
d’Escurac 1987 and Quass 1993. See also, especially for the Hellenistic age, Migeotte 1998 and Couilloud-
Le Dinahet 1988. On further problems concerning Hellenistic and Roman grain supply see the already quoted 
Kloft 1988. Descat 2004 describes the measures of the Greek towns for their grain supply and the control of 
their grain trade, reporting several epigraphs. Strubbe 1994 focuses on the feeding of the poor and needy. In 
further papers he focuses on sitonia, that is grain purchase, a custom that he considers typical of Asia Minor: 
Strubbe 1987 and 1989. The hypotheses of Strubbe have been discussed also by Erdkamp 2005, 268-283. 
See also the recent Bresson 2008, concerning urban grain funds and grain functionaries, and Dirscherl 2000: 
he provides a huge bibliography and comments on many inscriptions. 
102  See Remesal Rodríguez 1995, 356.
103  See Rickman 1980, 118-119.
104  Regarding this aspect the scholars have different positions and a few scholars (as Garnsey 1988, 255) 
claim that the main grain contributor was the African province.
105  I Tralles 80 (=CIG 292=Dürr 1881, 107, nº 23).
106  I Ephesos 211, SEG LII 2002, nº 1132. On this document see firstly Wörrle 1971. A recent comment 
on the letter is by De Romanis 2002: he thinks that the measure did not pertain to an emergency but had 
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that Emperor Hadrian allows these towns to import Egyptian wheat. Also Cyzicus re-
ceived from Hadrian the authorization to import Egyptian grain. 107 Garnsey believes 
that provincial import of Egyptian grain was not systematically planned. No doubt, 
all the requests had to go through the prefect’s office in Rome, and it is unlikely that 
the Emperor was always consulted: the prefect could sell as much grain as he liked to 
whomsoever he wished, although it is likely that he had to justify his conduct in front 
of the Emperor at a later date. In addition, considering the fact that in the above men-
tioned inscription, excluding Rome, the Ephesians were presented as the first grain 
recipients, we can suppose that there was more than one city that regularly needed 
to import grain from Egypt. 108 Garnsey’s overall description of the imperial impact 
on provincial food supply echoes his centralistic and to a certain extent primitivistic 
interpretation of Roman economy. 109
Concerning the interaction between centre and province in the field of food supply, 
we must recall Remesal Rodríguez’s position, based upon his redistributive interpre-
tation of imperial management of food supply. As we have seen, he describes the re-
lationships that emerged between Rome and each of the provinces, and those among 
the provinces, as modelled upon the Roman State’s needs which were basically the 
needs of the army and of the population of Rome. The Emperors were aware of such 
an interdependence between centre and periphery. Indeed, they tried to keep an equi-
librium between the interests of the State and those of the provinces and the single 
people, an effort which determined the role and the fortune of each of the provinces 
and, more generally, the political and administrative evolution of the Roman Empire. 
Such an equilibrium was created by Augustus, protected by the Antonine Emperors 
and collapsed under the Severian dynasty. 110
Regarding the impact of the Empire on food supply, the recent considerations 
of Erdkampf, which to some extent echo both the “primitivistic” interpretation of 
general validity.
107  OGIS 389 (see Pavis d’Escurac 1976, 131). We have evidence of such imperial permits from the first 
decade of Augustus’ Principate to the early 3rd century.
108  Garnsey 1988, 256-257.
109  “The period of the Principate witnessed increased interference in local affairs and a gradual decline in 
the civic spirit, which served as a shield against hunger and starvation. (…) The argument for the erosion of 
local initiative and patriotism might take in also the regulation and modification of the system of compulsory 
services or liturgies, the mounting burden of such services and other demands of central government to local 
communities, and the absolute reduction of local resources through expropriation by Roman Emperors and 
aristocrats. The impact of Roman rule was of course felt unequally. Egypt suffered most. (…) The surplus 
extracted from the provinces was consumed by the city of Rome, the court, the bureaucracy and the military. 
(…) In general, it may be suspected that the mass of ordinary cities of the Empire frequently lost out in the 
competition for grain to states which were favoured by prefects or Emperors for political or personal reasons” 
(Garnsey 1988, 267-268). Quite similar considerations are expressed by Alcock 2007, 691: “Appeals for 
state assistance in the food supply of Eastern cities are periodically recorded (…). Paradoxically, the physical 
presence of the Emperor, and all that he brought with him, could apparently trigger subsistence problems, as 
when Sparta, around the time of a Hadrianic visit, was also given permission to buy Egyptian wheat. Gifts of 
money (in times of trouble, such as earthquakes) and of goods such as marble columns (by petition) are other 
imperial additives to the Eastern economic mix”.
110  Remesal Rodríguez 1995; Id. 2008, 158, and Id. 2002a, 124: “La necesidad de proveer a Roma y al 
ejército determinó, en gran medida, el desarrollo político del imperio romano”; see also Id. 1999.
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Garnsey and the redistributive model of Remesal Rodríguez, are also worth recalling: 
“the presence of Roman authorities significantly altered the working of market in-
tervention and regulation. On the one hand, the Roman Emperor controlled huge 
amounts of corn and on occasion made these stocks available to provincial cities. 
On the other hand, urban rulers and their subjects could count on the intervention 
of provincial governors, who had the power and authority to force foreign traders, 
rich landowners and neighbouring communities into compliance”. 111 In particular, the 
imperial officials intervened occasionally against speculators, in order to ensure an 
adequate supply to the markets. 112
The imperial control on the provincial cities was possible thanks to an articulated 
network of relationships. The cooperation between the central government and lo-
cal élites through imperial officials was fundamental. As Burton explains, at least as 
far as the collection of taxes and the maintenance of order were involved, the central 
government produced some restrictions on the freedom of action of the local author-
ities, and could constrain and underpin the powers of local institutions. 113 A further 
aspect of such a network of relations between centre and periphery in the field of food 
supply is the phenomenon of the provincial requests sent directly to the Emperor, 
such as those of Tralleis and Ephesus already mentioned. 114 Such a peculiar dialogue 
can be considered a centralizing trait in the provincial food supply. 115 In any case, we 
cannot think of a central controlled system in a modern sense, since, as Erdkampf un-
derlines, in the Roman Empire “regulations are of limited scope. Ancient market reg-
ulation reflects the general reliance on local suppliers and their responses to dearth. 
(...) Provincial authorities offered support in the implementation of local regulations, 
but they did not intervene on their own initiative in local affairs. Throughout the 
imperial period, towns and cities remained self-governing bodies. The Roman au-
thorities expected the local élite to rule their communities by influence and authority, 
while they supported prominent cities by subventions of corn and access to external 
markets”. 116 According to Erdkamp, in particular, the limits of the intervention of 
Roman authorities also laid in a lack of means to address the shortcoming of the mar-
111  Erdkamp 2005, 267.
112  Erdkamp 2005, 265. On the problem represented by speculators in the Eastern provinces see Dio 
Chrysostomus, Or. 7.104, who speaks of sharp money-landing and accumulation of tenements, ships and 
slaves by the élites (see Alcock 2007, 692). Regarding the pressures on the local élites by the Emperor or his 
officials see also Kokkinia 2004, 42.
113  Burton 2001.
114  See in particular Sirks 2001, 121.
115  Furthermore we may well interpret this phenomenon as an aspect of “primitivism” in Roman economy, 
since it fundamentally implies a relationship of power.
116  Erdkamp 2005, 266-268. See also Burton 2001, 212 and Boatwright 2002, 8 and 53-54. Such a 
scenario of the rather limited possibilities of the imperial intervention through governors is underlined also by 
Kokkinia 2004, 57, who focuses especially on the East: “It is common knowledge that Roman rule in the East 
was based on the cooperation of local élites. But since Roman provincial authorities were not in a position to 
demand or impose such cooperation by force, we must conclude that the limits of governmental power were 
set by local realities”.
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ket. Consistently, state price fixing, as far as epigraphic evidence demonstrates, was 
rarely practiced in the first three centuries AD. 117
Given these considerations we can conclude that the impact of the Empire on pro-
vincial food supply was a rather complex phenomenon. No doubt, it was characterized 
by centripetal forces and aspects of centralization. 118 Nevertheless, it did not exclude 
the presence of centrifugal dynamics, aspects of “free” market and urban independent 
initiative. 119 Indeed, although the Roman government, through its provincial repre-
sentatives, showed occasional concern for the municipal grain supply and took a few 
specific initiatives, given the intrinsic limits of its intervention and control on the 
market, it usually left this task to the municipalities of provincial towns. The latter, 
therefore, tried to live off the produce of their hinterland, 120 relying –more or less oc-
casionally– on the private initiative of the wealthiest citizens, as they had done before 
the Roman conquest. Indeed, the growth of imperial properties between the 1st and the 
2nd century AD did not prevent the local élites from building up enormous fortunes 
and accumulate lands: the most prominent citizens, therefore, continued to support 
their cities as they had done before the Roman conquest, by protecting them from the 
unpredictability of the market. 121
7. The role of euergetism in imperial food supply
Following Garnsey, we have seen that such “private initiatives” of the wealthiest 
citizens, which had played an important role within Mediterranean food supply even 
before the Roman conquest, are to be ascribed to the realm of euergetism. 122 We can 
therefore conclude that the Greek culture of euergetism, frumentarian euergetism in-
cluded, was perfectly integrated into the new Roman Empire. In particular, it is clear 
117  Erdkamp 2005, 283-306.
118  Since, as we have seen, the necessity of food supply of Rome and the army strongly affected the overall 
Mediterranean economy, and the Emperor and his officials could in theory impose their decisions locally.
119  Such a duplicity is to some extent comparable to what we have seen regarding the organization of the 
annona of Rome: here, too, the imperial control had to rely on the “free” initiative of private merchants.
120  See also Hopkins 1983, 94.
121  The local élites’ support of urban supply in the Roman world has been underscored by Remesal 
Rodríguez 2012, 225: “El sistema urbano del mundo romano se basaba en que la elite de cada núcleo urbano 
estuviese interesada en iniciar sus carreras políticas dentro de su propia ciudad, contribuyendo al mantenimiento 
de la misma”. This interpretation is partly echoed by Jongman 2007; also Id. 2000 and Jongman – Dekker 
1989. Jongman underlines that public subsistence support was one of the salient features of life in Rome and 
elsewhere in the Empire and that the high level of Roman urbanization was underwritten by systematic public 
intervention in the urban food supply.
122  I follow the definition of euergetism provided by Zuiderhoek 2009, 6: “Euergetism was a form of gift-
exchange between a rich citizen and his (occasionally her) city/community of fellow citizens”. As Zuiderhoek 
points out, in ancient Greek euergesia was the term commonly used for a benefaction. “Euergetism” is a 
modern neologism: the Latin and Greek correspondents were liberalitas and philotimia, although both have 
wider connotations. A general analysis of euergetism in the Hellenistic and Roman cities, with its sociological 
implications, is provided by Veyne 1976, 20-43. On the frumentarian euergetism see Frézouls 1991.
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that the Emperor took over the role of “first euergetes”. 123 An aspect of this process 
was the establishment of a direct dialogue between the Emperors and the provincial 
communities during the 1st and 2nd century. 124 The relationship between the centre and 
the various provinces usually followed similar patterns and the system of communi-
cation was basically monarchic, more or less from the start. 125 The model proposed 
by Millar is “petition and response”. When possible, the Emperor dialogued directly 
with the urban communities, an action which had no doubt a strong ideological im-
pact. 126 Otherwise, the most eminent urban personalities acted as a kind of broker 
between the local town and the central government. 127 Millar provides us with many 
examples of legacies sent to the Emperor by provincial towns, especially by Eastern 
regions, 128 and imperial responses. The requests and communications submitted to 
the Emperor concerned the most diverse matters: disputes on local ceremonials and 
cult-observances, accusations, legal questions, dossiers of the honours awarded to 
local benefactors soliciting the Emperor’s approval. 129 Additionally we find requests 
for, or the confirming of privileges 130 as well as financial support which was based 
on money gifts or tax exemptions. Regarding this particular theme, as Millar points 
out, it became progressively hard to distinguish between money of the Emperor and 
that of the State. 131 Therefore, it was a matter of choice whether the Emperor “gave” 
money, or a remission of taxation: both measures could easily be ideologically inter-
preted as manifestations of the imperial private liberality, his providentia. 132 In such a 
123  See Millar 1977, 133-134 and 192. Also Nutton 1978, 209-210 and 217, and Veyne 1976, 621-632. 
See also Pavis d’Escurac 1987, 127-128, who also claims that regarding food supply the Roman Emperors 
took over the role of euergetai previously bestowed to Hellenistic kings. Also Ferrary 1997. Regarding the 
philosophical basis of Greek euergetism see Moretti 1977.
124  Such a process was anticipated by a phenomenon occurred in the late republican period, when many 
individuals from the East were able to build relationships with the Roman occupiers, obtaining many privileges 
for their communities: see Thériault 2003.
125  Eich 2012, 87.
126  See Millar 1977, 374-375. 
127  Hemelrijk 2004. See also Boatwright 2002, 1-17, 45-46 and passim.
128  This may depend on the fact that “it was there [i. e. in the East] that the concept of a city had the 
strongest hold, and the need for that status most keenly felt” (Millar 1977, 409).
129  See Millar 1977, 419. An example of such dossiers is provided by the immense inscription from 
Rhodiapolis in Lycia (138-150 AD) which provides a list of the honours awarded to a local millionaire, 
Opramoas: TAM II 905 (see the quite recent Kokkinia 2000). See also the letters sent by the new league of 
“Panhellenes” instituted by Hadrian to both the koinon of Hellenes in Asia and to Antoninus Pius, regarding to 
the services of M. Ulpius Eurycles of Aezani in Asia: OGIS 504-7 (see Kearsley 1987).
130  See, for instance, the passage where Dio Chrysostomus recalls the benefactions given by Trajan to 
Smyrne (Or. 40.14). Dio also defends his conduct toward his motherland Prusa by enumerating Trajan’s 
service to him at his request (Or. 40.15 and 45.3): “Even in normal times the Emperor was besieged with 
requests, and his friends could use their influence with him to secure titles and privileges for their home towns” 
(Nutton 1978, 216).
131  See the famous opening passage of the Res Gestae, where Augustus claims that he had created a State 
privato consilio et privata impensa (Remesal Rodríguez 2002a, 124-125).
132  Millar 1977, 425. Veyne 1976, believes that stricto sensu the Emperor was not the owner of the 
Empire: “Il n’est pas propriétaire de son Empire, mais il peut en être le mécène” (621) and “rien de bon ne 
doit être fait par personne dans l’Empire sans que l’Empereur n’en soit le vrai évergète” (640). Nevertheless, 
that the Emperor was felt as “owner” –at least in the case of Augustus and his successors– is indicated by 
Seneca, who writes (De ben. 7.6.3) that Caesar omnia habet, fiscus eius privata tantum ac sua et universa in 
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complex diplomatic network between centre and periphery, the solicitation and con-
sequent grant of grain benefices evidently played an important role. If the state capital 
that was generated from fiscal revenues was now indistinguishable from the imperial 
treasure, a similar process involved grain, since, as we have seen, a great deal of this 
cereal was now formally in the hands of the Emperor. 133 The obvious consequence 
of such a phenomenon was this: grain supply measures, as far as the Emperor was 
involved, had to be reinterpreted according to the ideology of euergesia. 134
As the literary sources confirm, until the Late Empire the Emperors made grain 
distributions in the provinces like those performed in Rome. For instance, the grain 
donation by the potential imperial successor Germanicus in favour of Alexandria is 
one of many cases in point. 135 It is worth observing that Emperor Tiberius’ complaints 
to the Senate regarding Germanicus’ initiative confirm that the control over grain was 
a major concern of the imperial power. 136 Trajan, in his turn, ordered grain to be sent 
from Rome to Egypt, during an Egyptian food crisis, as we learn from Plinius’ Pane-
gyricus. 137 The Panegyricus implies a strong propagandistic message concerning the 
imperial Providentia: the idea is that a good Emperor is someone who takes care of 
the needs of the people. 138 A passage by Cassius Dio recalls a corn dole in Athens pro-
moted by Hadrian. 139 The same city was granted grain also by Costantine, as we learn 
from Julian. 140 We have already recalled the permission given by Hadrian to Tralleis 
and Ephesus to import Egyptian grain. As some coin types from Tarsos demonstrate, 
both Caracalla and Severus Alexander provided this city with Egyptian grain. 141 As 
Millar has rightly underlined, we should make a distinction between permission to 
import and grain gifts. 142 In any case, since Egyptian grain belonged formally to the 
Emperor, both actions were probably interpreted as acts of liberality by him.
Among the imperial grain benefactions we can also cite Trajan’s alimentary pro-
gramme in Italy, although it may be argued that this was not an euergesia in the 
imperio eius sunt, in patrimonio propria. Indeed, the idea at the basis of the Julio-Claudian dominion, clearly 
expressed in the Res Gestae, was that the Emperor took care of the Empire by means of his own patrimonium 
(see Remesal Rodríguez 2012).
133  The similar destiny shared by fiscal money and grain is not surprising: grain and money were always 
considered on a par to each other, as the presence in the Empire of both money taxes and taxes in kind 
demonstrates.
134  See also Lo Cascio 2007, 632: “Other expenses were ideologically construed as emanating from the 
liberalitas of the Princeps. Distributions of coin (congiaria) and of corn (frumentationes) to the metropolitan 
plebs, handouts to the troops (donativa), and more generally personal gifts of the Emperor were the clearest 
expression of this ideology”.
135  Tac. Ann. 2.59: M. Silano L. Norbano consulibus Germanicus Aegyptum proficiscitur cognoscendae 
antiquitatis. Sed cura provinciae praetendebatur, levavitque apertis horreis pretia frugum multaque in vulgus 
grata usurpavit.
136  Remesal Rodríguez 2002a, 122.
137  Plin. Panegyr. 31. See also Rickman 1980, 115 and Garnsey 1988, 251-252.
138  Remesal Rodríguez 2002a, 125.
139  69.16.1-2. Grain gifts are mentioned among Hadrian’s benefactions also in Cass. Dio 69.5.2-3.
140  Or. I, 6/8d.
141  Ziegler 1977: the coins are described at 34-35 (pl. 3).
142  Millar 1977, 422.
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strict sense. 143 This programme implied that the interest on the loans taken out by 
landowners would go towards youths in need. 144 Moreover, it extended the right of re-
ceiving wheat distributions, whereas the previous frumentationes had been confined 
to Rome alone. 145 Such a measure, along with the institution of grain doles imitating 
the Roman frumentationes, seems to have been exceptional. 146 Apart from the already 
mentioned grain dole granted by Hadrian in Athens, we know that the same Emperor 
also created an alimentary scheme for children in Antinoopolis. 147 
From all these examples a central question arises: what relationship was there be-
tween imperial grain benefactions and the traditional frumentarian euergesiai that 
were made by the local élites? Did the Emperors aim at somewhat providing an 
example? Despite all these testimonies, it is rather problematic to build a unitary 
picture of the economic impact of imperial frumentarian euergetism given the essen-
tially sporadic epigraphic and literary evidence. 148 No doubt, we should approach the 
phenomenon of grain euergetism considering the differences among geographical 
areas and evaluating the single contexts, whilst integrating when possible the biased 
epigraphic evidence with the archaeological data. Indeed, the understanding of an-
cient euergetism on the whole is ultimately complicated further by the bias of the 
ancient sources attesting euergetic measures, which are invariably commissioned by 
the euergetes himself, or by his entourage and supporters. Moreover, such documents 
usually say nothing of the reasons of benefaction and the sum of money provid-
ed, which was not always necessarily conspicuous. 149 Therefore, it seems difficult 
to clarify the relations between imperial and non-imperial, Roman and pre-Roman 
euergetism and to what extent imperial euergetic measures influenced private initia-
tive and viceversa. As a matter of fact, the scholarly debate is still open. 150 Neverthe-
less, a few considerations are possible.
According to Eck we should make a distinction between imperial munificence and 
euergetic measures of private citizens. 151 And yet the similarity between the form and 
vocabulary of imperial and private euergetism is undeniable. Moreover, the provincial 
euergetes belongs to that very élite which plays the role of intermediary between the 
Emperor and the urban communities, as we have already seen, and is generally bound 
143  But see Bossu 1989, who underlines the “euergetic” value of the programme. See also Veyne 1976, 
648, who points out that such an imperial measure was everywhere interpreted as a form of indulgentia.
144  See Rickman 1980, 73-79 and Garnsey 1988, 252. See also the recent Page 2004. 
145  See Duncan-Jones 1964, in particular 142-144. Regarding the Augustan limitations to wheat gifts and 
Trajan generosity in distributions see Rickman 1980, 181-182. See also Woolf 1990.
146  Garnsey 1988, 252 and Erdkamp 2005, 276, who underlines that evidence for corn doles outside 
Rome is limited to a few cities in Lycia in the 2nd century AD and Egypt in the 3rd century.
147  Pap. Lond. Inv. 1905: see Bell 1940.
148  Sporadic both chronologically and geographically.
149  See Nutton 1978, 219, who observes that these documents reveal very little about the attitude of the 
provincials to the gifts and the giver.
150  On these structural problems of the evidence regarding euergetism see Eck 1997, in particular 315-
324. The bias of many inscriptions attesting euergetism –in particular of those from the Latin West– has been 
fairly examined by Witschel – Thomas 1992: they argued that often the archaeological evidence diminishes 
the grandiose claims reported on the buildings. See also Mitchell 1987, in particular 343-344.
151  Eck 1997, 306, footnote 2.
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to the Emperor by friendship. 152 This fact does not seem a coincidence: the Emperor 
might well have provided a model to emulate. 153 In this regard, it is interesting to note 
that a benefactor of the Phrygian Nacolea bequeathed a sum of money to his city: the 
interests produced in the subsequent three years were to be allocated to a grain fund 
and later divided among the citizens on Hadrian’s birthday. 154 The strict connection 
between the frumentarian beneficium and the Emperor is remarkable. Moreover, it is 
conceivable that the privately funded alimentary projects known in Lycia and Egypt 
were influenced by Trajan’s alimentary programme in Italy. 155 
A recurrent academic interpretation considers benefactions as gifts destined only 
to limited groups of privileged citizens: in this perspective euergetism appears sim-
ply a matter of coercion and self-interest, the mere attempt of the élites to legitimize 
their power and thus preserve their social position. 156 Similarly, the Emperor, being 
the largest landowner in the Empire, practiced euergetism in order to fulfill the polit-
ical and social role that was expected of him. 157 No doubt, it seems undeniable that 
there was a strict connection between euergetic measures plus social hierachization 
and the accumulation of wealth in few hands –the Emperor and the provincial élites 
commonly bound to him. 158 From this viewpoint euergetism appears more a “primi-
152  Barresi 2003, 205-210: he focuses mainly on the building euergetism.
153  According to Boatwright 2002, 6-8, who deals with the imperial euergetism in general, the 
individualized attention to towns provided by the Emperor was instrumental to the system of personal 
patronage underlying the social structure of the Roman Empire. It was one way Hadrian and other Emperors 
encouraged the provincial élites to contribute to their cities and Rome. The existence and repetition of these 
interactions reveal that imperial patronage was intrinsic to the endurance of the Empire. Although members of 
the municipal élite often played the role of brokers, the city benefited as a whole.
154  ILS 7196. See Garnsey 1988, 264.
155  Garnsey 1988, 262. See also Balland 1981, who suggests that the σιτομετρουμένοι ἄνδρες could be 
the municipal reflection of the Roman plebs frumentaria. According to Millar 1977, 192 and 200, on the other 
hand, the imperial euergetic measures, including the frumentarian euergesiai, were occasional and neither 
integrated nor long-term oriented, apart from Trajan’s alimentary programme. See also Pavis d’Escurac 1976, 
132: “Sans doute y a-t-il eu de la part du gouvernement impérial une action concertée; mais son application 
s’est faite cité par cité. Il apparaît toutefois que le plus souvent solutions ou palliatifs des crises annonaires 
des cités d’Asie Mineure leur vinrent de l’évergétisme des particuliers”. According to this interpretation the 
attitude of the Emperor appears fairly passive. Buraselis 2006, however, observed that there are still a handful 
of Emperors that by no means can be classed as passive, and Hadrian above all. Indeed, the reign of Hadrian 
represented somewhat a turning point in the field of imperial benefactions towards the cities: in this case the 
relationship between imperial and local euergesiai appears to be strong. See Boatwright 2002, 11-14: “His 
travels, ceaseless correspondence, and reception of embassies, often even his largesse itself, were mediated 
by cities’ grandees, whose social and political standing was concomitantly advanced by their association with 
the Emperor”.
156  See Zuiderhoek 2009, 32-36, who underlines as the occasional euergetic distributions of goods were 
gifts to the city or the citizens, not to the poor citizens, a category which –as Brown 2002 has argued– did 
not exist as a social group in the pagan civic world view. See also Veyne 1976, 94-163, who offers a general 
perspective regarding the sociological aspects of euergetism and its economic meaning: at page 95 he analyses 
the aspects of “ostentation et narcissisme” implied by euergetism. Also the specific case of grain distribution 
has been interpreted in this way, since we have evidence that the grain receivers were not the poorest people 
(see, e. g., the σιτομετρουμένοι ἄνδρες of the Lycian corn doles: Garnsey 1988, 262-265): see, for example, 
Van Nijf 1997.
157  Erdkamp 2007, 260.
158  See Alcock 2007, 678: “Increasing stratification in the control of agricultural wealth is manifest, not 
least in the material munificence in civic and (to a lesser extent) rural display”. See also Erdkamp 2007, 258: 
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tivistic” economic measure –primitivistic since it obviously implies a power relation-
ship and a social hierarchy– than a positive strategy aimed at stimulating economy. 159 
It is also worth considering, as Eck has demonstrated, that the imperial towns had 
generally various sources of public wealth: summae honorariae, tolls, products of the 
public lands. Thus, they normally managed to cope with their basic expenses without 
the contributions of benefactors. 160 Therefore, Eck concludes that the economic role 
of euergetism in the urban provincial scenario should not in fact be emphasized.
Regarding the already discussed possibility of the imperial exemplum influencing 
the provincial benefactors, the position expressed by Zuiderhoek reflects his social 
interpretation of euergetism. 161 If the Roman imperial system had a major influence 
on the proliferation of public offerings, this was mainly because it significantly con-
tributed to the growing oligarchization of political life and the increasing accumula-
tion of wealth in the hands of small groups of rich families during the 2nd century AD. 
Therefore, the euergetic ideology, which gave the role of “fathers of the community” 
to persons –the Emperor and the local notables– able to show philotimia, philopatria 
and liberalitas, was an effective strategy to justify such an increasing hierarchiza-
tion of society. Thus, although it is possible that local benefactions in the provinces 
were indeed imitations of the imperial euergesiai, it was the reality of power, its 
increasingly unequal distribution and the social tensions this created, that primarily 
stimulated the proliferation of provincial munificence during the 2nd century.
No doubt, all these considerations are convincing and encourage us to approach 
the phenomenon of grain euergetism by taking into account superstructural aspects 
–culture, ideology, propaganda, and social relations–, which are to a great extent 
inseparable from the dynamics of the economy. Nevertheless, as Zuiderhoek himself 
points out, frumentarian euergetism –essentially represented by grain distributions or 
gifts of money to buy grain– was a quite exceptional event. In fact, as far as evidence 
from Asia Minor indicates, the frequency of distributions among the benefactions 
was just 17 % versus 58 % of building euergesiai. Moreover, regarding the type 
of building, the number of structures connected to grain supply is negligible, while 
among the goods involved in public distributions, oil (presumably destined to gymna-
sia) and money were far and away more popular than grain. 162 Therefore, we can le-
gitimately hypothesize that the aim of grain benefaction was rather different from the 
scope of other kinds of euergesiai. In particular, its occasionality suggests that such a 
measure responded to specific needs in particular circumstances. Why should we in 
fact exclude the very logical conclusion that occasional grain benefactions respond-
“The towns and cities served as it were as the stage on which the landowning élite performed its social role, 
which encompassed much conspicuous consumption and acts of euergetism, that is, the expenditure on behalf 
of the community of citizens - primarily conceived as the citizens residing in the towns”.
159  This idea is very clearly expressed by Zuiderhoek 2009, 113-153 and passim: “Euergetism, of 
course, presupposes social inequality, i. e. hierarchy. It could only exist and function when there were enough 
sufficiently wealthy people who were able to act as benefactors. Its aim was not to abolish inequality, but to 
ensure the stable functioning of an oligarchic political system” (94). 
160  Eck 1997, 307-315, and Zuiderhoek 2009, 23-52.
161  Zuiderhoek 2009, 108-112.
162  See Zuiderhoek 2009, 79-80 and 89, figs. 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.5.
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ed to occasional situations of real shortage? Indeed, as Erdkamp recalls, although 
the Mediterranean cities generally managed to cope with their basic needs, dearth 
remained a serious risk and grain benefactions might well be a deliberate means of 
avoiding famine and helping the poorest people. 163 As far as the specific role of the 
Emperors is concerned, since, as we have seen, other kinds of imperial euergetism 
encouraged civic munificence, we may well hypothesize the same regarding frumen-
tarian euergetism. In particular, I believe that in the Roman Empire –which, as we 
have seen, was a scenario of central “limited control” on local food supplies– impe-
rial promotion of local frumentarian euergetism 164 may well be a feasible empirical 
strategy to positively affect the local food supplies. 165 Imperial promotion of local 
euergetism in this field may be interpreted as a sort of counter measure against the 
traditional rapacity and greed of landowners and dealers, who often speculated in 
grain and basic staples, as we learn above from a passage by Dio Chrysostomus. 166 
Moreover, state promotion of grain euergetism would prove an effective device in 
order to improve both the influence of the Emperor on his subjects (since what was 
previously free initiative would become “highly recommended”) and the imperial 
control over grain management that, as we have seen, was becoming more and more 
centralized in the 2nd century AD.
8. Conclusions
 
Roman economy during the first two centuries of the Empire, before the crisis of 
Marcus Aurelius’s time, was a particularly complex system. It was characterized by 
a strong vitality, which led to an increase in production promoted by the existence of 
a large-scale market, monetization and centres of consumption, but also by elements 
typical of a centralized “prestige economy”, such as state control, power relations and 
163  This idea mirrors Erdkamp’s interpretation of Roman grain economy, basically redistributive. Someone 
could recall the position of Veyne 1976, 729: “En ces temps lointains où l’économie n’était pas encore une 
profession, la classe politique ne considérait ses avantages économiques que comme les moyens de ses 
supériorités politiques et sociales. L’évérgetisme comme redistribution, cela a existé, mais accessoirement”. 
And yet Erdkamp 2005, 315, is right when writes that “the most prominent citizens of the towns and cities 
were the closest to the fire when things went wrong”. The fact that these measures adopted the language of 
euergetism is not surprising in the context of Eastern Mediterranean, so strictly imbued with this ideology. 
164  Through both direct distributions and the permission to import grain from abroad.
165  But see Veyne 1976, 647-651, who minimises the possibility of recognising an “economic intention” 
below imperial euergesiai (also Boatwright 2002, 72, who focuses on the very reign of Hadrian). 
Nevertheless, Veyne focuses only on Trajan’s alimenta. His methodological suggestion sounds particularly 
useful: “Il ne faut pas juger des intentions de Trajan d’après la rationalité de ses mesures, telle qu’elle apparaît 
à des yeux modernes”. The hypothesis I suggest –that “state” promotion of local grain euergetism may well 
be a particularly feasible strategy to positively affect the local food supplies– may thus appear a mere modern 
“superinterpretation”. Nevertheless, I do not take into account the intentions (more or less conscious) of the 
Roman Emperors: that is the reason why I have described the imperial promotion of local grain euergetism as 
an empirical measure (that is, a basically occasional measure).
166  See also Ferrer Maestro 2012, who quotes, for example, Emperor Julian’s initiatives against the 
food speculators in Antiochia during a drought: Jul. Misopog. 41. Julian speaks precisely of “greediness of 
the owners”.
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redistribution. This trend was particularly visible in sectors organized according to a 
centralistic logic, such as the food supply of the army and of Rome. In this case the 
patterns of distribution and the structures of inter-regional exchange in the Roman 
Empire clearly reflected the needs of the State.
Secondly, we have seen how between the 1st and the 2nd century the Emperors were 
strongly concerned with the food supply of Rome. Private traders must have played a 
role, since bringing in the grain was a profit-making enterprise, which became more 
attractive thanks to the favourable conditions offered by the state. Nevertheless, the 
preeminence of central government within the Roman food supply and its interventism 
cannot be denied. The “commercial activities” which materially provided Rome with 
food were merely an aspect of a fundamentally redistributive system of food supply.
As far as the impact of the Empire on provincial food supply is concerned, it was 
characterized by centripetal forces and aspects of centralization. Nevertheless, it did 
not exclude the presence of centrifugal dynamics, aspects of “free” market and free 
initiative by cities. Indeed, although the Roman government, through its provincial 
representatives, showed occasional concern for the municipal grain supply and took 
a few specific initiatives, given the intrinsic limits of its intervention and control on 
the market, it usually left this task to the municipalities of provincial towns. In this 
context grain euergetism –promoted by the Emperors through their example– could 
represent an effective means of positively affecting provincial food supply, given the 
fact that central control was structurally limited in the territories of the Empire. For 
this same reason, I also believe that imperial grain beneficia in the provinces repre-
sented an attempt to increase central control over imperial grain management.
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